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SPECIAL ISSUE:
THE STATE AND ILLEGALITY IN
INDONESIA
Introduction
Gerry van Klinken
Corruption talk in Indonesia is so old that it has its own classics. Mochtar
Lubis’s moving description of its effects in his novel Twilight in Jakarta
appeared in 1963. Outrage about it was central to the people power
movement that unseated President Suharto in 1998. President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono won a large popular mandate in 2004 for his prom-
ise to do something about it. But things change only slowly. The country’s
Transparency International corruption perception index rating still
wallows near the bottom of the global list, somewhere between Russia
and Sierra Leone. As I write, a decade into the ‘reform era’, one news-
paper article reports that up to 70% of the archaeological treasures in
one national museum may have been sold and replaced with fakes, and
another that the police are now the most distrusted government institu-
tion, closely followed by the judiciary and the legislature.1 Most people
write about corruption using the word ‘entrenched’. They link it with
other problems such as bureaucratic red tape, legal uncertainty and
political unresponsiveness; and they mean that it will take a long time
to fix.
So what are these illegal practices ‘entrenched’ in? It might seem
logical to think in the first place of the state. How otherwise could they
have survived so long, if the state did not somehow need them to func-
tion properly? Yet that has by no means always been the reasoning.
Long-standing popular discourse in Indonesia traces the problem to
individual moral failings – selfishness or lack of religion. The New
Order naturally encouraged talk of ‘bad apples’ [oknum], aiming to
1 Marianne Kearney (2007), ‘Dutch art expert on the run after theft of artefacts’, South
China Morning Post, 6 December; The Jakarta Post (2007), ‘Police seen as most
corrupt’, 7 December.
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deflect attention from the systematic nature of the abuses. But of course,
no serious analyst believes that Indonesia has proportionately more
immoral people than, say, Sweden. A more sophisticated explanation
current in Indonesia is that illegal practices are entrenched in culture.
This was Mochtar Lubis’s own view. Some years ago, the historian
Djoko Suryo said:
‘Under the Javanese kings the word corruption did not exist. But that
doesn’t mean behaviour similar to corruption did not exist. Tribute
beyond taxation was one example. That was normal at the time….
Probably the regents of those days only realised this was wrong after
Multatuli in [the novel] Max Havelaar harshly criticised their trib-
ute practices.’2
The Africanist J.P. Olivier de Sardan (1999) has explained contempo-
rary corruption with the logic of a ‘moral economy of corruption’, in
which tribal chiefs expect tribute, private and public affairs are indis-
tinguishable, and ordinary folk are not citizens with rights, but subjects
who must ingratiate themselves with the chief to get anything done.
Illegality disappears from this literature as an inappropriate alien im-
position. At most, illegality persists as a theatrical device in discourses
aiming to discredit rivals; but everyone understands that such talk is
hypocritical. The cultural argument remains an influential line of thought,
particularly among Africanists, many of whom think, with reason, that
the modern state is but a thin institutional veneer over a society whose
roots lie deeper. Western Indonesianists, too, have long used the con-
cept of (neo-)patrimonialism to capture the inequality in political
relationships. But in recent decades, their emphasis has increasingly
shifted to the ‘neo’ part of the term, meaning that modern phenomena
such as cash and bureaucratic power now overshadow traditional defer-
ence.
Internationally more popular among policy makers is a corruption
paradigm that in fact resembles the Indonesian oknum discourse, ex-
cept that it finds selfishness natural. Here, the state is seen as part of
the market. Officials are rational entrepreneurs who try to extract as
much ‘rent’ from the system as they can get away with. They enjoy a
degree of discretion in the way they collect or spend the large sums of
state money that pass through their hands. If their salaries are low, if
2 Suara Merdeka (1997), ‘Pamomong: Budaya “korupsi” di Jawa (1)’, 14 August.
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they are under pressure from all sides to do more than they can realis-
tically achieve, or if hardly anyone looks over their shoulder while
they work – so the argument goes – they are likely to collude with the
taxpayers or recipients to cream off some of it on the way. The litera-
ture on rents and rent-seeking originates with neo-liberal economists.
They had in mind individuals who made rational choices to further
their own, usually short-term, economic interests. This continues to be
the approach of mainstream literature on combating corruption (eg Rose-
Ackerman, 1999).
The state thus takes a curiously low profile in both the culturalist
and the marketist accounts. However, there is a substantial and grow-
ing third stream of literature on illegality that does take the state seriously.
Policy makers should take a greater interest in it. It comes in the first
place from area studies specialists (often historians), and more recently
from political scientists and economists as well.
In the introduction to an edited volume on ‘criminality’ in South
East Asia, Vicente Rafael (1999, p 10) quoted British scholar John
Furnivall’s ironic 1930s observation on the origins of crime in a Burma
administered by the colonial ‘Leviathan’:
‘When, under Leviathan, the ties of social life are loosed and men
become, as it were, free among the dead, one thing is as reasonable
as another; theft becomes as reasonable as honesty, provided that it
is not discovered. Leviathan may be omnipresent and all powerful,
but he does not, like your neighbour, live next door, or like your
conscience, nearer still. That is the explanation of the paradox that
Leviathan is least efficient where he is most effective; he cannot
maintain law and order so well as a society that maintains order without
law.’
In Furnivall’s view, the modern state operated as an alien force in a
pre-existing cultural environment. Crime emerged, not out of the pris-
tine culture, but out of this colonial interaction. This became a major
theme in South East Asian studies, notably at Cornell University under
the influence of O.W. Wolters and Benedict Anderson. It was an appro-
priate model for a long time. Colonial and independent states that lacked
legitimacy and acted coercively formed a pattern throughout South East
Asia in much of the twentieth century. Studies on bossism in the Phil-
ippines (Sidel, 1999), gangsterism in Thailand and Indonesia (Barker,
1998; Phongpaichit, Piriyarangsan and Treerat, 1998; Ryter, 1998),
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patron–client relations in Thailand and the Philippines (McCoy, 1993;
Ockey, 2004) – to name but a few examples – all explored the venality,
violence and unfair particularism that emerged at the interface between
state and society.
Now that Indonesia is a democracy, new lines of enquiry are emerg-
ing that recognize the state as more socially embedded than previously
thought. Fortunately, a set of intellectual tools is being developed by
both economists and political scientists that will lead to more subtle
understandings of the state in the developing world. Both are reading
the area studies literature. The economists Mushtaq Khan and K.S. Jomo
(2000) have proposed a bold Asian studies research agenda on ‘rents
and rent-seeking’ that recognizes the state as a socially useful set of
institutions. They see the state as a public arena that, contrary to the
neo-liberal originators of the term ‘rent-seeking’, cannot simply be re-
duced to the market. Its redistributive functions are often unfair and
even predatory, but they also often help reduce conflict and improve
ecological sustainability. Khan and Jomo identify real-world mecha-
nisms linking economic incentives (rents) to socially useful objectives
such as learning, technological innovation, natural resource conserva-
tion, and even political stability (buying off dissent). They then identify
mechanisms by which organized groups, including bureaucrats, politi-
cians, capitalists and non-capitalist ‘intermediate classes’ compete to
obtain these rents (in a process called rent-seeking).
Meanwhile, an emerging revisionist political science literature on
the state is also picking up and refining the somewhat wry take on the
state that has been commonplace in non-Western area studies for some
time. Abandoning the conventional Weberian ideal type of the autono-
mous, bureaucratic state ‘firing on all cylinders’ (as Migdal put it in a
foundational text in this area [2001, p 14]), it proposes simply studying
actual state practices with the eye of the ethnographer, minus the
Weberian assumptions. The state is no longer seen as a ‘thing’, but as a
relational arena. Its practices arise out of the interaction of numerous
social forces at different levels of the polity, from the commanding
heights to the village. The ‘ideal’ state, meanwhile, should be studied
for what it is, namely an ideological construct deployed by both state
officials and their opponents in civil society.
All four pieces in this themed edition of South East Asia Research
fall broadly into this third stream. They take the state seriously, but
are under no illusions that it is a cohesive bureaucratic machine.
Illegality emerges within the state precisely because it is an arena for
Introduction 161
contestation among many social forces. Instead of focusing on indi-
viduals out to improve their lifestyles, these papers look at whole
units. The motivation for taking part in illegal activities, too, has
important long-term and strategic aspects that may overrule individual
greed. In every case, the key idea is that state institutions are in com-
petition with each other. The core institutional interest is to maintain
freedom of action.
Kirksey and Harsono’s paper about a multiple murder on a mountain
road near the fabulously rich Freeport mine in Indonesia’s remote Papua
province in 2002 is in the first place a thoroughly documented exami-
nation. Three teachers, two Americans and an Indonesian, die in a hail
of bullets. Who did it – Papuan separatist guerrillas, or Indonesian sol-
diers? These authors make the surprising case that it may have been
both. Was there an elaborately engineered deception to make a military
attack on a civilian convoy look like a separatist attack and thus to
induce Freeport to increase its spending on military security against
separatist sabotage? The central character, a Papuan villager named
Antonius Wamang, who was convicted of the crime, typifies that
shadowy zone in which insurgency, counter-insurgency and black-
marketeering meet. The very distinction between legality and illegality
becomes confused when the state authorizes violent men in remote places
to use guns as they see fit. But behind this story lies the political economy
of off-budget financing. These murders might not have taken place if
the military had been wholly financed out of the official, democrati-
cally audited state budget.
McLeod’s paper on the ‘Suharto franchise’, and Mietzner’s on illicit
fund-raising by politicians, soldiers and bureaucrats, also focus on
underfunding. They complement each other superbly. Both take a macro
look at the whole nation and a period of decades – the New Order
(McLeod) and even the 60 years since independence (Mietzner). Both
describe the semi-legal and illegal off-budget economic activities state
actors engage in to make up the shortfall. Significantly, both empha-
size that the reason for constructing inadequate budgets is not lack of
funds. Here they stake out positions that contradict the mainstream
view on this subject. Instead, they both highlight strategic reasons why
some state actors prefer off-budget financing. They do differ some-
what on what those reasons might be. McLeod points to the top leader’s
need for loyalty. By making all below him dependent on him for their
positions and on funds generated at the expense of the general public
for their incomes, Suharto kept them loyal. Mietzner points to the historic
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preference of state units – from the army to political parties – to self-
fund in order to prevent others from interfering with them.
Buehler’s paper on syariah taxes in Indonesia’s South Sulawesi prov-
ince is a local study. But it too is about state actors seeking independent
financing. Rather than view the implementation of Islamic taxes as an
expression of public morality, Buehler prefers to see it as rent-seeking
by district-level power holders. Taking a percentage out of civil serv-
ants’ salaries in order to help support religious activities is not very
clearly illegal, but it is a form of political corruption. The money col-
lected in the name of the poor is actually used by the incumbent for his
own political purposes. Buehler picks up an argument from James Scott
that political corruption and machine politics have a historical institu-
tional setting, namely the early phases of democratization, and in
particular democratic decentralization. Pork-barrelling brings in the votes
by appealing both to voters’ sense of morality and to their hip pocket.
These papers were among a larger number presented at a well at-
tended panel of the Fifth Euroseas Conference in Naples, Italy, in
September 2007. We will soon be holding a workshop around this theme
again, with a view to producing an edited volume.
One of the questioners at the panel objected that the term ‘illegality’
in the panel’s title was a blunt instrument, since not all illegal actions
were widely felt to be immoral as well; indeed, they often contribute to
the mutuality of a healthy community. At the same time, not all im-
moral actions by government officials are illegal. Our reply to this is
that, whether considered immoral or not, illegality introduces its own,
sharply competitive dynamics into a social situation. Being outside the
official tolerance of the state creates a special status. This limits the
kinds of people who can conduct these practices, and enhances the
kinds of profits that can flow from them. Illegal (collusive or nepotistic)
business deals create the space collective state actors need to build
political coalitions with societal partners against perceived rivals. Such
coalitions are unstable and insecure, and even potentially violent, since
the deals that underpin them cannot be enforced in the law courts. They
are also unfair, elitist and predatory. They are not built on universal
law, but on the local, the contingent and the particular – on personal
relations, patronage and moral myths. They are all about building he-
gemony under insecure conditions. If we can understand this, we have
also understood more clearly that the state is a ‘material condensation’
of interrelating social forces, as Poulantzas put it (1978, pp 128–129).
It is a constantly contested system for political domination, at different
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levels; and it does not inherently require the law. The law is applied
pragmatically and selectively, not to restrain the state, but to dispose of
rivals, to reduce pressure from too many claimants and to preserve
relations with foreign powers.
A central message of this edition of SEAR is thus that we must first
put in the effort to understand how illegality works, what it is ‘en-
trenched’ in, before we design recipes for change. None of this means,
of course, that we quietly think nothing will change. All five authors
are clearly driven by feelings that they know they share with many
Indonesians. Outrage about human rights abuse and impunity lies just
below the surface of Kirksey and Harsono’s forensic investigation.
Behind McLeod’s piece lies a conviction that states should not use
their coercive powers to facilitate private enrichment. Mietzner and
Buehler each structure their papers around popular hopes in democ-
racy. In Indonesia’s longue durée, therefore, it is not only illegality
that is entrenched, but also the growing protest against it.
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